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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced his intention to
withdraw from the international climate agreement known as the Paris 
Agreement.1 The withdrawal was met with vocal outcry and a show of 
resistance from citizens, CEOs, and various global leaders.2 The agreement, 
first signed into by President Barack Obama in August of 2016, was aimed
at creating a system of international cooperation and accountability regarding 
responses to the global threat of climate change.3 It called for adopting 
more green energy sources, reducing greenhouse emissions over the length 
of the agreement, and ultimately limiting the rise of global temperatures.4 
In his withdrawal announcement, President Trump cited concerns about 
the fairness of the agreement, as other global powers like China and India 
would not be subject to the same requirements and obligations as the United 
States.5 Although it differed structurally from previous United Nations 
agreements aimed at international cooperation against climate change, the 
Paris Agreement ultimately was another in a series of global climate 
agreements that failed to last. 
1. Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-
climate-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/XF2P-FUB].
2. Scott Clement & Brady Dennis, Post-ABC Poll: Nearly 6 in 10 Oppose Trump 
Scrapping Paris Agreement, WASH.POST (June 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
energy-environment/wp/2017/06/05/post-abc-poll-nearly-6-in-10-oppose-trump-scrapping-
paris-agreement/?utm_term=.46618bec6ac6 [http://perma.cc/UL23-TLVW].
 3.  See Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 2, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/
paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf [hereinafter Paris Agreement] 
[http://perma.cc/62Y8-WGLY].
4.  Camila Domonoske, So What Exactly Is in the Paris Climate Accord?, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (June 1, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/01/531048986/ 
so-what-exactly-is-in-the-paris-climate-accord [https://perma.cc/JDL2-Y2R9].
 5.  See William Galston, Trump’s Paris Withdrawal: What It Means and What 
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This Article is structured to give context as to the history of United
Nations-sponsored, climate change centered, international agreements from 
the early 1990s to the present. The Article also shows how the goals and 
responsibilities placed on the United States as a part of the Paris Agreement
may still be realized even without full party membership. Additionally,
the Article discusses the structural framework of the Paris Agreement and 
the significance of its legal classification when deciding how President
Trump can leave the agreement in accordance with international law.  The
Article will also discuss how President Trump’s actions regarding the Paris
Agreement will impact the international climate change field, and what 
sorts of solutions are available at both the state and national level. 
Specifically, Part II of this Article will provide a background on  the  
history of the United States’ approach to climate change agreements 
proposed over the past thirty years, the various United Nations sponsored
agreements proposed and enacted by previous presidential administrations,
and how the Paris Agreement compared to previous attempts. Part III will 
focus primarily on the various means of withdrawal from or termination 
of the Paris Agreement by the Trump administration.  Depending on President 
Trump’s concerns, there are a few different ways that the United States
can end its membership in the Paris Agreement.  The options vary regarding 
speed of withdrawal or termination, and level of international legality.  
Part III will also focus on what sort of precedent exists for a unilateral
withdrawal by the Trump administration without the advice and consent 
of the Senate, and ultimately whether or not this power is constitutional.  
Finally, Part IV will focus on the potential ramifications both domestically
and globally stemming from President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement. Part IV further addresses how best to reconcile President Trump’s 
goals of protecting the United States’ power at the international table and
maintaining economic strength domestically with the important global 
goals set forth by our international peers. 
II. A BACKGROUND ON CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES AND 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 
Responses to the issue of climate change over the past decades have 
been shaped both internationally and domestically by economic, political, 
diplomatic, and scientific factors, among others. National responses and
reactions have varied, ranging from misinformation of the existence of
climate change, to active participation in reforming actions and discontinuing 
harmful practices and behaviors believed to contribute to the problem.
129








    
  
    
   




   
   
 




   
   
 
     
  
   
 
 
       
     
 
   
    
 
   
 
    
       
 
Although scientists have attempted to make the issue digestible and  
comprehensible for politicians and policymakers,6 there still exists a back 
and forth struggle about how best to address environmental concerns. Because
such global and national dissension still exists over this polarizing topic, 
many attempts to combat climate change have been challenged in the 
political sphere.7 However, to address such a global, significant problem
to all human life, there is a need for international cooperation. 
Population growth trends have made climate change an important topic
for international discussion. As the global population trends toward almost
ten billion by 2050,8 and the U.S. population toward 438 million by 2050,9 
scientists,10 legal thinkers,11 and concerned citizens12 have all shown great
interest as to the effect this population growth has on the climate.  There
are general concerns that “consumption of goods and services whose draw 
on resources for their fabrication, distribution, sale and use causes the emission
of [greenhouse gases].”13 More births lead to a greater need for resources 
such as food, water, clothing, housing, schools, and hospitals, among many
others.14 These resources, produced at the hand of human activity, have
 6.  See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Summary for
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2013), https://www. 
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WGIAR5_SPM_brochure_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
93FL-J3XK].
7.  Justin Worland, Climate Change Used to Be a Bipartisan Issue. Here’s What 
Changed, TIME (July 27, 2017), http://time.com/4874888/climate-change-politics-history/
[http://perma.cc/PX7Z-PCEG]. 
 8.  World Population to Hit 8bn in 2023, Says New UN Survey, THE GUARDIAN
(June 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jun/21/world-
population-to-hit-8bn-in-2023-says-new-un-survey [http://perma.cc/5AYG-G433].
 9.  U.S. Population Could Reach 438 Million by 2050, and Immigration is Key,
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.prb.org/Publications/ 
Articles/2008/pewprojections.aspx [http://perma.cc/N8L7-U2DY]. 
10. See, e.g., Andrew Griffin, 15,000 Scientists Give Catastrophic Warning About 
the Fate of the World in New ‘Letter to Humanity’, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 13, 2017, 3:51
PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/letter-to-humanity-warning-climate-change- 
global-warming-scientists-union-concerned-a8052481.html [http://perma.cc/2P2M-GCPC].
11. See, e.g., Matthew Brodahl & William A. Shutkin, Exactly the Right Amount: 
Municipal Water Efficiency, Population Growth, and Climate Change, 14 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 337 (2011). 
12. See, e.g., Why We Need to Address Population Growth’s Effects on Global Warming, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-
population-and-climate-change-20150125-story.html [http://perma.cc/S6NW-Q6ZN].
13. David Satterrthwaite, The Implications of Population Growth and Urbanization 
for Climate Change, 21(2) ENV’T & URBANIZATION 545, 547 (2009). 
14. See Juliet Eilperin, Population Growth Taxing Planet’s Resources, WASH. POST
(Oct. 23, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/population-growth- 
taxing-planets-resources/2011/10/16/gIQAD9bMAM_story.html (explaining how population 
growth is having clear ecological distortion effects causing depletions in water, fish, forests,
fuel, and food) [http://perma.cc/Y54A-FL2S]. 
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generally accounted for the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions over
the past thirty years.15 Additionally, as the issue has become more well-
known and better understood, policy makers and government officials began 
to take more preventative actions. 
A. The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”) was introduced to encourage international cooperation and 
participation in response to the increased greenhouse gas emissions caused 
by human activities. The treaty acknowledged that the “global nature of 
climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries 
and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response.”16
At the time, 154 nations signed the UNFCCC.17 Now there are 197 parties 
to the convention.18 This treaty, signed by President George H.W. Bush,
was approved by the Senate in 1992,19 giving the treaty statutory approval
and enforceability.20
This United Nations treaty aimed to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”21 The treaty established a framework 
and introduced protocols to limit average global temperature increases and 
resulting climate change.22 It placed different obligations on developing 
15. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-16-002, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2014 (2016). 
16. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
17. Timeline of Major UN Climate Negotiations, ENVTL. ENERGY STUDY INST., https://
www.eesi.org/policy/international (last visited Aug. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8ED4-LDF4]. 
18. Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process/the- 
convention/news-and-updates (last visited July 27, 2018) [http://perma.cc/TW33-SU65].
19. S. Res. 38, 102nd Cong. (1992) (enacted) (“Resolved that the Senate advise and 
consent to the ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (“Convention”), and signed on
behalf of the United States at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro on June 12, 1992.”). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
21. UNFCCC, supra note 16, at 4.
22. Id.
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and developed countries.23  According to Professor Daniel Bodansky, the
multilateral treaty introduced many general commitments including: 
[U]se of best available technology to limit greenhouse gas emissions; promotion 
of energy efficiency and conservation; development of renewable energy sources; 
promotion of sustainable forest management; removal of subsidies that contribute 
to global warming; harmonization of national policies, taxes, and efficiency
standards; internalization of costs; and development and coordination of market 
instruments.24 
Most importantly, the treaty committed all parties to “develop, periodically 
update, publish and make available to the Conference of the Parties . . . 
national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals
by sinks of all greenhouse gases . . . using comparable methodologies to
be agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties.”25 
The treaty required parties to “adopt national policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases. . . .”26 Additionally, it encouraged international
communication and cooperation—requiring communication between party
members.27 This treaty effectively laid the foundation for the issue of climate
change in the domestic and international legal landscapes, shaping and 
structuring succeeding agreements. The UNFCCC established a system 
to keep track of the problem, required progress reports from both developed and
developing countries, and served as the parent treaty when introducing new
UN climate-focused agreements. Additionally, it served as the backdrop for 
the Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen Accord, and Paris Agreement—all of which
were discussed at their respective annual UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties (COP). 
B.  The Kyoto Protocol
Following the ratification of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol was 
introduced in an attempt to build off of the UNFCCC foundation. The  
Kyoto Protocol was signed in December 199728 and entered into force in
23. Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: 
A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 505 (1993). 
24. Id. at 508. 
25. UNFCCC, supra note 16, at 4. 
26. Id.
27. Id. 
28. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]. 
132
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February 2005.29 This agreement was built upon the framework set out in 
the UNFCCC to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions and sought to attain
firm commitments to reduce emissions by a particular amount in developed
countries.30 The Kyoto Protocol was unique because it was the first to stem 
from the UNFCCC.  Additionally, it mandated that industrialized nations 
cut their greenhouse gas emissions.31 However, due to fears of what impact
the binding reductions would have on countries in the midst of development, 
then-Vice President of the United States Al Gore noted to developing 
nations that “[w]e understand that your first priority is to lift your citizens 
from the poverty so many endure, and build strong economies that will
assure a better future. This is your right. It will not be denied.”32 This served
as Vice President Gore’s rationale for agreeing to the binding terms of the 
KyotoProtocol. However, theSenateand the following presidential administration 
were less accepting of the binding emission reductions and financial 
obligations imposed by the Kyoto Protocol.33 
The binding language of the agreement called for signatories to cut their
country’s greenhouse gas emissions to five percent below 1990 levels between
2008 and 2012.34 In response to President Clinton’s Kyoto Protocol proposition, 
the United States Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in July of 1997
by a 95-0 vote which provided that:
29. Kyoto Protocol Comes into Force, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2005, 10:12 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2005/feb/16/sciencenews.environment [http://perma.cc/
XPW5-8FRK].
30. Laura Poppick, Twelve Years Ago, the Kyoto Protocol Set the Stage for Global
Climate Change Policy, SMITHSONIAN (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
science-nature/twelve-years-ago-kyoto-protocol-set-stage-global-climate-change-policy-
180962229/ [https://perma.cc/WZ76-66G6]. 
31. Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/26/world/kyoto-
protocol-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2018, 12:06 PM) [http://perma.cc/
DH4R-3R6H].
32. Vice President Al Gore, Speech at the Kyoto Climate Change Conference (Dec.
8, 1997), (transcript available at https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/EOP/OVP/
speeches/kyotofin.html [https://perma.cc/5R8C-9WTY]).
33. See Julian  Borger,  Bush Kills Global Warming Treaty, THE GUARDIAN (Mar.
29, 2001, 3:28 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming. 
usnews [http://perma.cc/D228-3QML].
34. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 28, at 24. 
133
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[T]he United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement
regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992,
at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would mandate 
new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties,
unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country 
Parties within the same compliance period . . . .35
Despite President Clinton’s efforts, the United States Senate made it 
clear to future administrations that the United States would not become a
signatory of an international agreement that imposes such strict and binding
requirements on its parties. Although President Clinton signed the Kyoto
Protocol with the hopes of binding the United States to its obligations, 
President George W. Bush did away with the protocol after his election in 
2000 citing concerns about the lack of participation or requirement on 
developing countries.36 Additionally, President Bush noted that the binding
financial obligations of the protocol would hinder the United States economy
while exempting large population centers from bearing the cost.37 
C.  The Copenhagen Accord
Twelve years after President Clinton’s and Vice President Gore’s attempt 
to bind the United States to the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, President 
Barack Obama sought to introduce a less-binding international agreement, 
one which many hoped would represent a big step forward regarding 
international action toward climate change.38 At the 2009 United Nations
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, “[a] new political accord [was]
struck by world leaders . . . [which provided] for explicit emission pledges
by all the major economies—including, for the first time, China and other 
major developing countries—but chart[ed] no clear path toward a treaty with
binding commitments.”39 
Labeled as a political agreement rather than a binding agreement, there 
were multiple key elements of the agreement including: 
35. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
36. See Julian Borger, Bush Kills Global Warming Treaty, THE GUARDIAN (Mar.
29, 2001, 3:28 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming.
usnews [http://perma.cc/D228-3QML].
37. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007). 
38. See Alden Meyer, The Copenhagen Accord: Not Everything We Wanted, But 
Something to Build On, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/global- 
warming/solutions/reduce-emissions/the-copenhagen-accord.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/5JCT-X282]. 
39. Outcomes of the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, CTR. FOR  
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/content/cop-15-copenhagen/ (last
visited Nov. 18, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6E9R-NJ3S].
134
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An aspirational goal of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius . . . 
broad terms for the reporting and verification of countries’ actions . . . a collective
commitment by developed countries for $30 billion in “new and additional”
resources in 2010-2012 to help developing countries reduce emissions, preserve
forests, and adapt to climate change [and a] goal of mobilizing $100 billion a 
year . . . to address developing county needs.40 
Many critics took issue with the accord. First, critics argued that the
lack of a binding agreement failed to promote progress, as it would not
hold countries accountable for the promises they made.41 Second, critics 
objected to the Copenhagen Accord under the belief that without any clearly
defined national contribution measures or rules, countries would struggle 
to make meaningful progress toward lower greenhouse gas emissions.42 
Despite the backlash, the agreement still had some positive results. The 
proposal set goals and was a step in the right direction by uniting China, 
India, South Africa, and Brazil regarding carbon emission plans.43  Getting
these countries in agreement was important, as the greenhouse gas reductions 
these countries made as a part of the Copenhagen Accord were their first 
such ones; these nations had failed to commit to such reductions under the 
Kyoto Protocol.44 Additionally, although many have been critical of the
lack of binding commitments in the Copenhagen Accord45 and the failure 
to introduce a formal global agreement addressing climate change mitigation 
techniques,46 the Accord encouraged international cooperation and subjected 
party members to international pressures to achieve climate reduction goals.47 
Between Senate outrage at the binding requirements the Kyoto Protocol 
proposed and environmentalist disappointment at the somewhat toothless 
Copenhagen Accord, there was a need to introduce a new plan that satisfied
40. Id. (emphasis added). 
41. Kelley Inman, The Symbolic Copenhagen Accord Falls Short of Goals, 17 U.
BALT. J. ENVTL. 219, 225 (2010). 
42. Id. at 225–26.
43. David Biello, U.S., China, India, and Other Nations Arrive at Nonbinding Agreement
at U.N. Climate Summit, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Dec. 18, 2009), https://www.scientific 
american.com/article/us-china-india-climate-accord/ [https://perma.cc/247F-TPR5]. 
44. Richard L. Ottinger, Introduction: Copenhagen Climate Conference—Success 
or Failure?, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 411, 412 (2010). 
45.  See Ben Lieberman, The Copenhagen Conference: A Setback for Bad Climate 
Policy in 2010, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 19, 2010), https://www.heritage.org/environment/
report/the-copenhagen-conference-setback-bad-climate-policy-2010 [https://perma.cc/
V2RA-45QM].
46. Ottinger, supra note 44. 
47. See Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 
104 AM. J. INT’L L. 230, 239–40 (2010). 
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both sides of the argument. This new plan called for an international agreement
that would impose strict enough requirements to make real environmental 
progress—unlike the Copenhagen Accord—while not imposing as many 
binding requirements as that of the Kyoto Protocol. What followed was
an international agreement with compromise that contained both binding
and nonbinding elements. 
D.  The Paris Agreement
In December 2015, as a result of the UNFCCC’s efforts and built upon
the foundation of previous agreements, there was a global call to action to 
curb dangerous anthropogenic trends. This attempt was the landmark climate 
change agreement referred to as the Paris Agreement, agreed to in December
2015 and signed in August of 2016.48 Where the Kyoto Protocol and
Copenhagen Accord had failed, the Paris Agreement sought to correct.
Where the Kyoto Protocol proposed a plethora of binding targets and
requirements, the Paris Agreement provided a far more flexible structure.49 
It included specialized and nationally determined contributions and quinquennial 
progress reports to monitor progress made.50 The individualized, pledge-
based system of greenhouse gas emission reductions, where countries were
able to set their own commitments, was far less brittle and rigid than its
predecessor agreements.51 It also included a means to financially assist
developing countries “with respect to both mitigation and adaptation 
in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.”52 
In the international law context, the Paris Agreement was a treaty in 
accordance with the terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
For an agreement to receive international treaty force, the Vienna Convention 
requires that it must be signed as “an international agreement concluded
between states in a written form and governed by international law.”53  At
the time, President Barack Obama noted that “[t]he Paris Agreement
48. John D. Sutter, Joshua Berlinger & Ralph Ellis, Obama: Climate Agreement ‘Best
Chance We Have’ to Save the Planet, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/12/world/global-
climate-change-conference-vote/ (last updated Dec. 14, 2015, 1:02 AM) [https://perma.cc/ 
R25U-SH7W].
49. Brad Plumer, Stay In or Leave the Paris Climate Deal? Lessons from Kyoto, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/climate/paris-climate-
agreement-kyoto-protocol.html [https://perma.cc/L83D-2RZ3].
50. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.
51. David G. Victor, Why Supreme Court’s Action Creates Opportunity on Climate, 
YALE ENV’T 360 (Feb. 17, 2016), https://e360.yale.edu/features/why_supreme_courts_
action_creates_opportunity_on_climate [https://perma.cc/3SEH-NTKV].
52.  See Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 9.
53. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
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establishe[d] the enduring framework the world needs to solve the climate 
crisis,” and that it “create[d] the mechanism, the architecture, for us to
continually tackle this problem in an effective way.”54 
Unlike the previously discussed Copenhagen Accord, the Paris Agreement 
represented a more significant step forward in the international climate
change context. Supporters have noted that the Paris Agreement was more
successful than the Copenhagen Accord because it built on the previously
agreed upon but not binding political agreement.55 Supporters argued that
the Paris Agreement was a necessary progression, as it built on the structure 
put in place by both the UNFCCC and the Copenhagen Accord in three 
important ways. First, the Paris Agreement abandoned the strict dichotomy
of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries.56  Under the new agreement, all
countries share many of the same international obligations. Second, the
agreement created a longer temporal framework “establish[ing] a treaty
regime of indefinite determination”57—unlike the Copenhagen Accord’s
limited scale set to end in 2020. Third, the agreement provided more 
transparent rules and a clearer framework for introducing nationally
determined contributions.58 
The agreement’s purpose was to establish individualized national goals 
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.59 The agreement established a 
global warming goal calling for a 2°C reduction from pre-industrial averages.60 
It promoted a flexible standard for achieving climate related goals. Specifically, 
the agreement relied on voluntary mitigations made by individual countries 
54. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Paris Climate Agreement
(Dec. 12, 2015), (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/12/12/statement-president-paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/9FHN-
EVK8]).
55.  See Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?, 
110 A.J.I.L. 288, 317 (2016) (discussing what makes the Paris Climate Change Agreement
a historic agreement and how it departs from the existing paradigms in international climate




59. Gwynne Taraska & Ben Bovarnick, THE AUTHORITY FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION
IN THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (2015), https://cdn.american
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/InternationalExecutiveAgreements-report1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/TXE9-5FGB].
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rather than strict, bright-line tests applying to all countries equally.61 Each 
country has a nationally determined contribution (NDC) consisting of their 
plans and efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which will be 
submitted every five years starting in 2020.62 
The inclusion of both binding and non-binding language made 
classification of the Paris Agreement difficult. Specifically, there are provisions 
in the agreement that only suggest participation through use of the word 
“should.”63 Using this language regarding some of the larger commitments
of the agreement makes the agreement’s material provisions seem less 
binding and less imposing than those of the Kyoto Protocol. However, 
the inclusion of responsibility-bearing verbs like “shall”64 or “will”65 for
some of the more immaterial provisions of the agreement still impose
binding obligations on signing parties.66 Even though, on its face, the non-
binding language used in material provisions makes the overall character
of the agreement appear non-binding, the provisions still function in
accordance with the overall binding goal of the agreement to lower carbon 
emissions over time.67 Some argue that imposing a material goal like that 
of the Paris Agreement on the United States (even while including non-
binding individual provisions) makes the agreement more binding and of 
a legal character, and therefore it should have had to pass through the advice
and consent of the Senate.68 
Despite its complex legal character, the simultaneously binding and
non-binding Paris Agreement succeeded at contributing to the global 
environmental call to action and spawning new programs and attempts.
According to the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment, “[t]here are now over 1,200 climate change or climate change- 
relevant laws worldwide, a twentyfold increase over 20 years: in 1997 there
were about 60 climate laws in place.”69 Additionally “two-thirds of court 
61. Id.
62. Swell Chan, Key Points of the Paris Climate Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015,
11:40 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-
talks/key-points-of-the-final-paris-climate-draft [https://perma.cc/TK43-RQBV].
63. See, e.g., Paris Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 4.4, 4.19.
64. See, e.g., id. arts. 4.2, 4.8.
65. See, e.g., id. art. 2. 
66. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 REV.
EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL L. 142, 145 (2016). 
67.  See Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty Power?: The Constitutionality of
Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L. REV. 371, 386 (2016) (discussing how the Paris
Agreement  should be  categorized partly based  on the use of  language in the agreement
and where binding language was used in comparison to where non-binding language was 
used). 
68. See id. at 385–87. 
69. Michal Nachmany, Sam Fankhauser, Joana Setzer & Alina Averchenkova, Global
Trends in Climate Change Legislation and Litigation, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. 5 
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cases challenging regulation have either strengthened or maintained climate
change regulation.”70 From an international perspective, the Paris Agreement 
increased global cooperation and set forth a new framework for climate 
change analysis. 
However, on June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced his
intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement noting that the agreement
“subject[s] our citizens to harsh economic restrictions and fails to live up 
to our environmental ideals.”71 While countries like Italy, Brazil, France, 
and Germany made progress in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions 
under the Paris Agreement framework and in solidifying themselves as
global leaders in combatting climate change,72 the United States has essentially 
announced its intention to relinquish its seat at the head of the international 
table. President Trump’s administration sent its notice to the United Nations 
to share “the U.S. intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as soon as 
it is eligible to do so, consistent with the terms of the Agreement.”73 
The administration noted in its withdrawal that “[t]he United States will 
continue to participate in international climate change negotiations and
meetings, including the 23rd Conference of the Parties (COP-23) of the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, to protect U.S. interests
and ensure all future policy options remain open to the administration.”74 
However, this appearance that the United States wants to remain at the
global table and in the international conversation while remaining the sole




71. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017) (transcript 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-
paris-climate-accord/ [http://perma.cc/BKG2-3HZX]). 
72. See Jack Loughran, Paris Agreement: Italy, Brazil, France and Germany Take 
Lead as Others Fall Behind, ENGINEERING & TECH. (July 7, 2017), https://eandt.theiet.org/ 
content/articles/2017/07/paris-agreement-italy-brazil-france-and-germany-take-the-lead-
as-others-fail-to-reduce-emissions/ [http://perma.cc/7CTV-8552]. 
73. Press Release, Office of the Spokesperson, Communication Regarding Intent to 
Withdraw from Paris Agreement, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ 
prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm [http://perma.cc/6U9L-RBD2] [hereinafter Trump Statement]. 
74. Id.
139
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creates a situation where the United States would be the only country opposed 
to the agreement.75 
Although the Trump administration noted that President Trump “is open 
to re-engaging in the Paris Agreement if the United States can identify 
terms that are more favorable to it, its businesses, its workers, its people, 
and its taxpayers,”76 the UNFCCC has announced no such intention to this
point. To the contrary, the UNFCCC released a statement responding to 
the Trump administration’s decision and noted that “[t]he Paris Agreement 
remains a historic treaty signed by 195 Parties and ratified by 146 countries 
plus the European Union. Therefore it cannot be renegotiated based on the
request of a single Party.”77 Without indication of either side budging, the
forthcoming official withdrawal from the Paris Agreement seems inevitable.
President Trump made this decision despite pressure from some of the 
largest United States companies including Facebook, Apple, Google, Intel, 
Salesforce, and many others.78 These companies attempted to reach out
and convince President Trump that the Paris Agreement benefitted domestic 
businesses and the United States economy.79 They further noted that remaining
in the agreement benefitted the United States economy through stronger 
competition, market creation and growth, and the reduction of business risks.80 
In addition, many energy companies including Exxon Mobil, Chevron,
BP, and Shell announced their support of the Paris Agreement.81  Shell CEO
Ben van Beurden believes that the United States’ role in the climate change 
discussion is vital, stating that “the world needs to go through an energy
transition to prevent a very significant rise in global temperatures. And we 
need to be part of that solution in making it happen.”82 Despite the pressure
by the technology and energy industries, President Trump has not announced
any intention to rejoin the agreement without introducing substantial changes
to the framework and obligations. However, there are still different options
75. See Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-
paris-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/H9WZ-CJLA]. 
76. Trump Statement, supra note 73. 
77. UNFCCC Statement on the US Decision to Withdraw from Paris Agreement,
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (June 1, 2017), https:// 
unfccc.int/news/unfccc-statement-on-the-us-decision-to-withdraw-from-paris-agreement 
[http://perma.cc/59DA-URPN].
78. See Business Support for the Paris Agreement, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/content/business-support-for-the-paris-agreement/ [http://
perma.cc/BFJ5-42YE] (last visited July 28, 2018). 
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Samantha Raphelson, Energy Companies Urge Trump to Remain in Paris Agreement, 
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for President Trump to consider regarding withdrawal from or termination 
of the agreement. 
III. WITHDRAWAL/TERMINATION OPTIONS
There are questions as to how President Trump would go about a
withdrawal from or termination of the Paris Agreement, because as of now
he has only announced his intention to withdraw. Regarding the temporal 
element of the withdrawal, the Paris Agreement explicitly states that any 
country wishing to withdraw must wait four years from the date of agreement.83 
This would make November 2020 as the soonest the United States could 
officially withdraw from the agreement.84 Also, because the Paris Agreement
uses non-binding language for more of its material provisions, unlike those 
that its predecessors the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol contained, the
United States’ failure to follow the obligations put in place under the Paris 
Agreement will not have any ramifications. This means that if President 
Trump chooses to wait out the specified length, he and the United States 
would be leaving as per the terms of the agreement itself.85 
This appears to be the Trump administration’s plan: withdrawing in
accordance with the official provisions of the agreement. Specifically, the
withdrawal letter sent to UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, by UN 
Representative, Nikki Haley, specifically states that “the United States 
will submit to the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 28, paragraph 
1 of the Agreement, formal written notification of its withdrawal as soon 
as it is eligible to do so.”86  This language seems to signify that the withdrawal 
will be in accordance with the terms of the agreement once the administration
is able to withdraw officially. 
83. See Paris Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 28.1–28.2. 
84. See Trump Is Reportedly Looking for the Quickest Way Out of the Climate Deal, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 14, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/14/donald-trump-paris-climate-
change-deal/ [http://perma.cc/F5QS-7YZN]. 
85. See Ethan G. Shenkman, Michael B. Gerrard & Erika Norman, 9 Things to Know
About Trump’s Paris Agreement Decision, ARNOLD & PORTER (June 2, 2017), https://www. 
arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/06/9-things-to-know-about-trumps-
paris-agreement [http://perma.cc/38TY-TRKJ].
86. Karl Mathiesen, Trump Letter to UN on Leaving Paris Climate Accord—in Full, 











      
        
 
      
  
 
    




       
     
   
     
   





   
  
 
    
 
  
      
 
 
    
   
 
   
    
However, a couple alternative options exist. Article 28 of the Paris 
Agreement states that “[a]ny Party that withdraws from the [UNFCCC] shall 
be considered as also having withdrawn from this Agreement.”87  One option
is for President Trump to withdraw from the Paris Agreement’s parent
treaty, the UNFCCC.88 This would expedite the process of withdrawal but
may have international ramifications. Such a decision would largely remove 
the United States from the international discussion regarding global climate 
change initiatives on a much quicker timeline than that of the current
withdrawal procedure set in place by the Paris Agreement, which may be 
a concern as other countries take on increased global leadership roles.89 
Also, withdrawal from the UNFCCC would be an aggressive option that 
may hurt the trust other countries have with the United States going forward.90 
Although this would still be considered a withdrawal as per the terms of
the agreement, there has been no indication that the Trump administration 
plans to withdraw from the UNFCCC to expedite the process.
A second and even faster process would be to abrogate the agreement 
entirely and immediately, leaving out of accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. Such an abrogation may be possible and allowed under Article
50 of the Vienna Convention. Article 50 allows for a party to unilaterally 
abrogate a treaty outside of the specified notice period “[i]f the expression
of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured through the 
corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating
State. . . .”91  There does not seem to be any indication that the Trump
administration is contemplating termination under the terms of the Vienna 
Convention.
However, if there is no basis of corruption or fraud for abrogation and 
the Trump administration still abrogates the agreement, such a decision 
would break international law under the laws of the Vienna Convention 
by failing to withdraw or terminate on specified and allowed grounds.  A 
decision like this from the Trump administration would likely come from 
a belief that the material commitments make the legal character of the
Paris Agreement that of a binding treaty. Supporters of this option would 
argue that because the agreement brings binding domestic obligations, it 
must be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate under the United
87. See Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 28.3. 
88. See John Upton, 3 Ways Trump Could Abandon the Paris Climate Pact, CLIMATE
CENT. (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/trump-could-abandon-paris-
climate-agreement-20711 [http://perma.cc/5BL6-BFUC].
89. See Lisa Friedman, As U.S. Sheds Role as Climate Change Leader, Who Will 
Fill the Void?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/climate/
bonn-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/E5AU-DEHB].
90. See Mathiesen, supra note 86. 
91. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 53, art. 50.
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States Constitution.92 Because the Paris Agreement did not go through the
advice and consent of the Senate process, theagreement would be unconstitutional.
From there, supporters of abrogation would likely regard continuing with
prescribed withdrawal terms based on Article 28 to be acting in opposition 
to the Constitution, and thus immediate abrogation of the agreement is the
only remaining solution in accordance with the Constitution. However,
there does not seem to be any indication that the Trump administration is 
considering immediate abrogation, especially as he has left the door open 
to a potential return to the Paris Agreement if key changes are made to the 
United States’ obligation as a member of the agreement.93 
A.  Constitutional Basis for Unilateral Presidential Withdrawal 
The Constitution provides that the President “shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur.”94 However, the Constitution does
not mention which branch has the power to withdraw from treaties.95 
Although the text of the Constitution does not textually clarify the issue
regarding the President’s ability to withdraw from treaties, there is debate
as to why the President should have such withdrawal power.96 
The belief that the President should have such withdrawal powers, although 
not explicitly stated in the Constitution, came in part from the Sole Organ 
Doctrine.97 The Sole Organ Doctrine stemmed from a speech John Marshall
gave in front of the House of Representatives in 1800 where Marshall
“described the President as ‘the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.’”98  Over 130 years
later, the Supreme Court of the United States spoke to this idea in the 1936
case United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.99 In this case,
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
93. See Donald Trump Says He Might Sign Back Up to a Revamped Paris Accord, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2018, 8:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/28/ 
donald-trump-says-he-might-sign-back-up-to-a-revamped-paris-accord [http://perma.cc/
E73U-S3W3]. 
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
95. See MICHAEL RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 157 (2007). 
96. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future
of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1326–28 (2008). 
97. See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 
99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1012 (2013). 
98. Id. 
99. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
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Justice Sutherland reiterated and expanded upon Marshall’s theory, noting 
that “the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of
the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate;
but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot 
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”100 
Another theory in support of this unilateral withdrawal power, as proposed
by Alexander Hamilton, is that it is necessary for the President to have 
these sorts of powers, as “[a] feeble Executive implies a feeble execution
of the government.”101  To support this theory, one must look at the actual text 
of the Article I and II Vesting Clauses alongside the Article III Judicial
Power Clause.102 
Even though the Constitution does not explicitly discuss the withdrawal 
or termination power regarding treaties, a textual analysis of the introductory
language in the Article I and Article II Vesting Clause and the visible textual 
distinctions may help clarify the issue.103 Whereas the Article I Vesting 
Clause states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States,”104 the Article II Vesting Clause regarding
the Executive Branch’s powers does not contain the same language.105 
Instead, the Executive Vesting Clause notes only that “[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”106 
and is not restricted to only the powers “herein granted”, unlike the Article 
I Vesting Clause. As a result, debate existed as to whether the language of 
the Executive Vesting Clause has left more discretion to the President.107 
This textual difference was important when trying to ascertain presidential 
powers not explicitly specified. Thus, the independent foreign powers that
the President enjoyed, coupled with the legal basis of existing treaties and
congressional authority delegated to him/her, should provide a sufficient
basis for the president to unilaterally withdraw from, terminate, or introduce 
new treaties under the Vesting Clause powers granted in the Constitution. 
However, counter arguments exist as to this unilateral treaty-making
and withdrawal power. For instance, some argue that the Sole Organ Doctrine 
permits the President to act as a sole representative in international discussion 
and treaty-making; however, the text of the Constitution makes it clear
100. Id.
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
102. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 256–57 (2001). 
103. Id.
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
106. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. 
107. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and 
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 553 (2004). 
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that the President does not have such unilateral power to make treaties 
without both the advice and consent of the Senate.108 Therefore, he/she
should not have the power to terminate or abrogate a treaty without the 
advice and consent of the Senate either.109
B. The Supreme Court Speaks (Through Silence) to the Issue:
Goldwater v. Carter
In the past, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to speak on whether 
or not the President of the United States has the ability to unilaterally
withdraw from treaties.110 The legal character of the Paris Agreement plays
an important role into whether President Trump should have the ability to 
unilaterally withdraw from the agreement. If the agreement was viewed
solely as a non-binding executive agreement, then there would likely be 
no issue with a President’s unilateral withdrawal. However, the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to speak on the issue has left the answer unclear.
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter chose to terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China.111 Following 
President Carter’s decision, Senator Barry Goldwater filed suit in order to
gain “a declaration that the President’s attempt to terminate unilaterally
the treaty with the Republic of China was ‘unconstitutional, illegal, null
and void,’ and that ‘any decision of the United States to terminate the 
[Mutual] Defense Treaty must be made by and with the full consultation
of the entire Congress, and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or 
with the approval of both Houses of Congress.’”112 However, when this
case of Goldwater v. Carter made it to the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist’s 
plurality opinion stated, “I am of the view that the basic question presented
by the petitioners in this case is ‘political’ and therefore nonjusticiable 
because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s 
foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is
authorized to negate the action of the President.”113
108.  See Luke A. McLaurin, Can the President “Unsign” a Treaty? A Constitutional
Inquiry, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1941, 1980 (2006). 
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1942–43.
111. Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Goldwater v. Carter: The Constitutional Allocation of
Power in Treaty Termination, 6 YALE J. INT’L L. 81 (1980). 
112. Id. at 82 (quoting Complaint for Declaratory and Injunction Relief at 1–2, Goldwater
v. Carter, 481 F. Supp, 949 (D.D.C. 1979)).
113. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979).
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Justice Rehnquist’s belief stems from the political question doctrine, 
which was later clarified by Justice White and the Supreme Court in 1986.  
In a 1986 case concerning an agreement entered into between Japan and 
the Secretary of Commerce, Justice White stated that “[t]he political question 
doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve
around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed
for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive 
Branch.”114 
Legal thinkers have since interpreted Judge Rehnquist’s opinion as 
giving the President the power to withdraw from treaties unilaterally or to 
do so without court interference.115 Further, in 2002, President George W.
Bush unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 Senate-ratified Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty without interference.116 Thus, a similar line of reasoning may
keep the Supreme Court from intervening in President Trump’s unilateral
withdrawal, as it may resemble the political question that the Supreme Court 
in Goldwater v. Carter chose not to interfere with. 
However, President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does 
differ from both President Carter’s and President Bush’s unilateral withdrawals. 
Unlike the Mutual Defense Treaty, which was in action from 1955-1979,117 
and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which began in 1972 and ended in 2002,118 
President Trump’s withdrawal in 2017 came only a year and a half after
President Obama signed the Paris Agreement in 2016. This expedited 
unilateral withdrawal is worth another look by the courts. 
C.  The Legal Standards and Framework for International Agreements 
The international standards for treaty withdrawal must also be weighed
to determine whether President Trump’s actions regarding the Paris Agreement 
will have lasting ramifications in international law context.  The standard 
114. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
115. Guy M. Miller, Treaty Termination Under the United States Constitution: Reassessing 
the Legacy of Goldwater v. Carter, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 859, 868 (1995). 
116. See Emily K. Penney, Is That Legal?: The United States’ Unilateral Withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2002). 
117. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., It Takes Two to Tear It Up; Congress and the President 
Share the Responsibility, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
archive/opinions/2001/08/05/it-takes-two-to-tear-it-up/aba0ee19-c3ca-4467-9672-3476c27a6fef/ 
?utm_term=.2bed0c049c47 [http://perma.cc/K3KA-NE86].
118. See Terence Neilan, Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/bush-pulls- 
out-of-abm-treaty-putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html [http://perma.cc/AR3F-HZWG].
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that governed international agreements was the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.119 
Although the United States was not a ratified party to the Vienna Convention,
it was a signatory, and it relied on the Vienna Convention to guide understandings 
of international law.120 Under the law of the Convention, a party’s obligation
as part of a treaty may be invalidated and terminated for multiple reasons 
including error, fraud, corruption, coercion, and breach among others.121 It
does not seem as though President Trump’s withdrawal in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement would fit into any of these categories to 
allow for abrogation of the agreement. However, if he chose to expedite 
the process by abrogating the agreement entirely, this could constitute a
violation of international law under the Vienna Convention, Article 18. 
Specifically, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention notes that “[a] State is 
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a 
treaty when it has signed the treaty or exchanged instruments constituting the
treaty subject to ratification.”122 
1.  International Agreements, Legal Character, and Significance 
International agreements can take a variety of forms. They can include 
a “treaty, convention, agreement, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act,
declaration, concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minute, memorandum
of agreement, memorandum of understanding, and modus vivendi.”123 
However, the distinction between domestic treaties and international treaties 
is one to be mindful of.124 Although the Constitution does not speak to the 
difference between the dueling terms,125 the distinction was codified by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in the 1982 case of Weinberger v.
Rossi.126  In Weinbeger v. Rossi, Justice Rehnquist cited the Vienna Convention
and noted:
119. See Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty 
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 433 (2004). 
120. Id. at 435. 
121. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 49–53, May 23, 1969, 155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
122. Id. at art. 18. 
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 301 (1987). 
124. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 34 (1982). 
125. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 187 (2007). 
126. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 34. 
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The word ‘treaty’ has more than one meaning. Under principles of international 
law, the word ordinarily refers to an international agreement concluded between
sovereigns, regardless of the manner in which the agreement is brought into 
force.  Under the United States Constitution, of course, the word ‘treaty’ has a far
more restrictive meaning. Article II, § 2, cl. 2, of that instrument provides that the 
President ‘shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.’127 
Legal thinkers have tried to clarify how the public should view these
international treaties and agreements.  As Professor Michael Ramsey clarified,
it is easier to look at many international treaties as “presidential announcements 
of policy [as they] do not impose material costs upon changes in policy.  
They do not commit the nation to particular policies for the future, legally
or practically.”128  However, although they are not all considered binding
treaties in the domestic sense, the treaties do reflect the intentions of the 
United States to act within the boundaries of the proposed agreements,
and the treaties are still intended as binding promises in accordance with
international law.129 
Nevertheless, it is more often that international agreements come in the 
form of executive agreements.130 These executive agreements are distinguishable
from treaties, as they typically do not require approval from the Senate
before being enacted, and thus do not have the same weight of congressional
consent behind them as Article II Treaties that have passed through the 
advice and consent of the Senate.131 
2.  The Classification of the Paris Agreement 
Whether President Trump has the Constitutional authority to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement without facing significant repercussions ultimately
depends on the legal character and classification of the agreement itself.
If the Agreement is regarded as a sole executive order, the binding effects
would be limited, and President Trump would likely have the power to
withdraw unilaterally. However, due to the binding elements of the agreement 
and the previous Senate authorization of its parent treaty (the UNFCCC),
127. Id. at 29–30. 
128. RAMSEY, supra note 125, at 188. 
129. See generally, id.
130. See  MICHAEL GARCIA, CONG. RES. SER., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 4  (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL32528.pdf [http://perma.cc/48B8-4P6Q] (stating that “the great majority of international
agreements that the United States enters into are not treaties but executive agreements— 
agreements entered into by the executive branch that are not submitted to the Senate for
its advice and consent”). 
131. See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring 
the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 181 (2009). 
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unilateral withdrawal or termination would be more difficult for President 
Trump. There are multiple conflicting theories about the classification of 
the Paris Agreement; however, an underreported alternative utilized often 
by the Obama Administration in the past may provide the best analytical
framework through which the Paris Agreement should be evaluated. 
a.  The Paris Agreement as a Nonbinding Sole Executive Agreement
The most common interpretation of the Paris Agreement is that it is a
sole executive and nonbinding agreement. Sole executive agreements are
the product of a President making an agreement alone, held in check by 
his constitutional powers.132 Sole executive agreements are enacted without
the consent and advice of the Senate, and thus are not allowed to impose 
binding domestic obligations.133 These agreements are believed to have 
the most legal force when they relate to issues of military, recognition of
a foreign government, settlement of international claims or when the President 
acts in accordance with express or implied Congressional authorization.134 
Contrarily, when the President’s decision is directly in contrast “with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, [the President’s] power is at its 
lowest ebb.”135 
The belief that the Paris Agreement should be viewed as a sole executive 
agreement stems from the fact that President Obama did not send the  
agreement to the Senate for approval, and would have been unlikely to 
find support had he done so.136 Additionally, this theory is supported by
proponents under the belief that the Paris Agreement imposes no truly binding 
norms.  Without imposing such norms, agreement without Congressional 
approval would be acceptable. However, this is not the best way to analyze 
132. Id. at 211. 
133. See id. 
134. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and 
in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth), to personify the federal sovereignty.
If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the
Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power.”). 
135. Id. at 637. 
136. See generally Noah Feldman, The Paris Accord and the Reality of Presidential 











    
      
   
   
  
  
    
   
     
   
  
     
 
   
    
  
    
  
   
    
  
      
 
 
      
  
    
    
   
   
 
 
   
the legal character of the agreement because it fails to account for the 
previous Senate approval the parent treaty received, and thus should provide
more force behind the Paris Agreement. 
b.  The Paris Agreement as a Nontreaty Agreement with 
Binding Elements 
Another potential classification for the Paris Agreement is an agreement
with some binding elements, yet one not considered a binding treaty as a 
whole. Professor Michael Ramsey argued that the Paris Agreement should
have been classified as a nonbinding agreement with binding elements based
on the structural make-up of the agreement.137 Specifically, Professor Ramsey
looked at both the language and the procedural elements that weighed in
favor of a binding status.138 However, because the agreement contained 
both binding and nonbinding terminology, depending on the parties and
specific provisions, classification was difficult. The classification ultimately 
relies on the subjective weighing of the binding and nonbinding factors.139 
Specifically, Professor Ramsey analyzed the framework of the Paris Agreement
to illustrate the potential dangers of leaving ambiguity as to the binding
or nonbinding nature of international commitments—as it may leave the 
door open to executive vagueness in the future when implementing executive
agreements similar to the Paris Agreement.140 
c.  The Paris Agreement as a Binding Treaty with Domestic Obligations 
Some have made the argument that the Paris Agreement has more elements
and obligations indicative of an Article II Treaty, and thus should have 
been submitted to the Senate prior to enactment. This argument rests on 
the language used and requirements identified in the agreement itself, specifically
“[t]he commitments made pursuant to the agreement are significant, open-
ended, and legally binding on the United States, seemingly in perpetuity.”141 
Additionally, the five-year reporting requirement proposed under the Paris
Agreement is viewed by some as an obligation worthy of regarding the 
Paris Agreement as a binding treaty.142 If the agreement was a binding treaty
imposing future obligations, then President Trump’s administration could 
137. Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty Power?: The Constitutionality of Nonbinding




140. See id. at 386. 
141. Steven Groves, The Paris Agreement Is a Treaty and Should Be Submitted to 
the Senate, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 15, 2016), /
the-paris-agreement-treaty-and-should-be-submitted-the-senate [http://perma.cc/XU9J-G3X8].
142. Id. at 7. 
150
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withdraw from the treaty under the theory that it is inconsistent with the
Constitution.143 However this does not seem to be the case, as nowhere in 
the adoption of the Paris Agreement was there any advice or consent by
the Senate. Thus, the Paris Agreement does not seem to be an entirely binding 
treaty with domestic obligations on the United States. Any such “treaty”
that did not go through the advice and consent of the Senate requirement
would be unconstitutional, and thus may present an opportunity for abrogation
by the President. 
d.  The Paris Agreement as an Executive Agreement+
However, there is an alternative option for consideration as proposed
by the Obama Administration. This alternative classification is referred
to by some legal thinkers as an Executive Agreement+ (EA+).144  An EA+
is a categorization of executive agreements that does not fit neatly into the 
current understanding of international agreement formation. An EA+ enactment
rests on congressionally approved policies that are already in place, and such
agreements are consistent with and further these policies.145 Additionally,
these agreements must
be capable of implementation on the basis of existing federal law. They cannot
be used by the President to change an existing statute or extend the executive’s
domestic authority. Second, EA+ are appropriate only as a complement to existing
domestic measures, in order to address the transnational aspects of a problem.146 
According to Professor Bodansky and Professor Peter Spiro, the Obama 
Administration had already introduced multiple EA+ before signing on to
the Paris Agreement.147 In at least three separate instances the Obama
administration entered into agreements which, based on past conceptions, 
would be viewed as sole-executive agreements; instead, these agreements
have served as a structural framework for future agreements based on related 
legislative authority.148 The connective fiber between these agreements
was that they were all based on a pre-existing law authorized by Congress.
143. See MICHAEL RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 168–70
(2007). 
144. See Dan Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements +, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 885, 886–87 (2016). 
145.  Id. at 887–88, 897–98. 
146. Id. at 915. 
147.  Id. at 908, 910–11. 
148. See id. at 907. 
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Professors Bodansky and Spiro interpreted, “[i]f Congress asks the 
President to work with other countries to establish effective international 
standards, and the standards that the president negotiates are consistent 
with existing U.S. law, the President is acting in alignment with Congress,
rather than in opposition to it.”149 
When analyzing the Paris Agreement, multiple factors weigh in favor 
of Professor Bodansky’s and Professor Spiro’s EA+ classification rather 
than a strict sole executive agreement.150 First, Professor Bodansky and
Professor Spiro noted the procedural nature of the Paris Agreement is 
distinguishable from the flat line binding emissions standards proposed in 
the Kyoto Protocol, which were struck down handily by the Senate.151  Instead,
the requirements of submitting reports and conducting international review 
seem to fit under the aforementioned ‘Sole Organ’ theory of the President.152 
Second, because the Paris Agreement builds on the framework established 
by the Senate-supported UNFCCC, there is reason to believe that the
necessary Senate support is in place and thus the Paris Agreement should
be regarded as an EA+.153  Legal support for the enforcement of the Paris
Agreement stems from the previous Senate approval of the UNFCCC
Article II treaty. Third, the Paris Agreement should be categorized as an 
EA+ based on the fact it complements current existing law by addressing
an issue which the Senate has previously voiced support in favor of. 
Critics of Professor Bodansky’s and Professor Spiro’s approach have
noted this may be a slight mischaracterization rather than a uniquely novel
and new invention by the Obama Administration.154  Additionally, critics
have noted the difficulty an EA+ poses due to the general inability to determine
whether there is existing legal basis for an EA+ classification.155  Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith looked at the Minamata Convention of Mercury
signed as an international agreement by President Obama in 2013 and noted 
that this agreement was problematic for EA+ classification for two major 
reasons. They argued the agreement, concerned with the production, use, 
and disposal of mercury, was neither acknowledged as within the President’s 
149. See id. at 909. 
150. See id. at 917–19. 
151. See id. at 917–18. 
152. See id. at 916–18. 
153. See id. at 918–19. 
154. See David A. Wirth, Executive Agreements Relying on Implied Statutory Authority:
A Response to Bodansky and Spiro, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 741, 743 (2017). 
155. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International 
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1217 (2018) (“The Executive Agreements+ example highlights 
how opaque the process is for making international agreements without congressional 
input. The Obama Administration concluded the Minamata Convention without offering 
any clear public explanation of the precise legal basis for the agreement.”).
152
HUBINGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019 12:57 PM      
  
   
  
   
   
  






    
  







   
  
      
   
     
     





       
  
  




[VOL. 20:  127, 2018] Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
authority to conclude sole executive agreements nor did the Obama
Administration claim that Congress actually authorized the Convention.156 
Bradley and Goldsmith concluded the low requirements for EA+ classification 
ultimately make it difficult to determine whether an agreement is ultimately
in support of existing federal law, and thus EA+ classification is riddled
with vagueness and secrecy.157 
However, Professor David Wirth voiced support in favor Professor 
Bodansky’s and Professor Spiro’s classification.  Professor Wirth noted
that the analogous procedural requirements found in the UNFCCC Article
II Treaty and the Paris Agreement served as a domestic legal authority which 
bestowed the United States the ability to introduce such commitments without
explicit congressional or Senate approval.158 Ultimately, this new classification
is better for international agreements as the classification provides more 
flexibility for agreements aimed at supporting a pre-existing, congressionally 
approved goal.  In the case of the Paris Agreement, an EA+ classification
would be proper based on the pre-existing legislative support found in the
UNFCCC.
3.  Domestic Deference to International Obligations?
Some argue the Paris Agreement imposes domestic obligations on United 
States citizens.159 However, because one of the goals behind the Paris
Agreement was to encourage collaborative efforts to tackling climate change,160 
there were no specifications for how to impose penalties for failing to meet
the agreement’s standards.161 The Supreme Court had taken steps in the
past to clarify what sort of effect international executive agreements have 
in domestic law.162 Particularly, the Supreme Court noted that “not all
international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law 
enforceable in United States courts.”163 Additionally, the Court has established
that “absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural
rules of the forum [s]tate govern the implementation of the treaty in that 
156. Id. at 1216. 
157. Id. at 1263. 
158. Wirth, supra note 154, at 747.
159. See Groves, supra note 141. 
160. Id. 
161. Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS:
INTERNATIONAL (June 2017). 
162. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008). 
163. Id. 
153
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[s]tate.”164 Similarly here, the Paris Agreement cannot constitute binding
federal law over individuals and citizens in the United States without passing
through the proper channels of ratification and congressional approval.
However, a withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does not stop and has 
not stopped states and individual citizens from exercising their own 
sovereignty and remaining committed to the provisions put in place by the
Paris Agreement.165 Rather, there are currently efforts for what some have 
recognized as “shuttle diplomacy” where international leaders have had 
discussions with state leaders in order to continue efforts to combat the
international problem.166 These communications and discussions have allowed 
for “states and local communities [to] join forces, develop and share 
information and expertise, and work across jurisdictions with the help of
facilitators such as academic institutions and other partners to move forward 
in the absence of federal leadership and partnership.”167 Thus, this state 
and local community action taken in the aftermath of President Trump’s 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement creates an interesting discussion on
how the goals can be achieved going forward. 
Waiting the required length as specified by the terms of the agreement 
and withdrawing unilaterally seems to be the likeliest option by the Trump
Administration.  The Trump Administration would likely not violate
international law by waiting pursuant to specified withdrawal provisions 
of the agreement. Further, the Trump Administration would still gain the 
benefit of membership as part of the parent treaty, the UNFCCC.  There
is historical precedent for unilateral presidential withdrawal from an international 
agreement as per the terms of the agreement.168 In 2001, President Bush
unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty the United 
States had previously made.169 However, because the text of the agreement 
provided a broad termination provision that a party could withdraw “if
[the party] decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter
of this [t]reaty, have jeopardized [the party’s] supreme interests,”170 President 
Bush’s withdrawal satisfied the terms of the agreement and provides a
164. Id. at 517 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 351 (2006)).
165. Max Greenwood, 20 states, 50 cities sign pledge to abide by Paris agreement
even if US withdraws, THE HILL: ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT (Nov. 11, 2017, 11:22 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/359910-20-states-50-cities-sign-pledge-
to-abide-by-paris-agreement-even-if [http://perma.cc/2XMX-S3EF]. 
166. Vicki Arroyo, State and Local Climate Leadership in the Trumpocene, 11 CARBON
& CLIMATE L. REV. 303, 306 (2017). 
167. Id. at 310.
168. See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, *2–3 (D.D.C. 2002).
169.  Id. 
170. See Miller, supra note 115, at 1301.
154
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model for what may be a simple and straightforward means of withdrawal
for President Trump.
The drawback to waiting is timing. The United States could officially 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement, as per the terms of the agreement, in
November 2020.171 This may not be appealing to the Trump Administration,
as it would take effect following the next United States presidential election.  
Because potentially leaving such a large decision up to the next president 
may not lend itself to accomplishing the Trump Administration’s goals, it
is not unreasonable to believe that the Trump Administration may try to 
expedite the process through one of the aforementioned means of expedited
withdrawal or abrogation.172 
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT
Although there are a few different means by which President Trump and
his administration may pursue withdrawal from the agreement, some of
the ramifications look similar regardless of the route taken. 
One of the largest potential ramifications of President Trump’s actions 
is the enormous gap left at the international table regarding global leadership
and approaches to combatting climate change.173 Without participation from
the United States, many climate initiatives pushing for renewable energy,
energy efficiency, forest conservation, and other projects that reduce greenhouse
gas emissions are less likely to succeed due to less spending.174 Without 
contributions from the United States, which totaled about $2.4 billion 
committed to climate finance in 2014, other industrialized countries would 
have a greater responsibility to act as a global leader.175  But the burden does
not apply solely to the industrialized countries. Another fear is that without
171. See Robinson Meyer, Trump and the Paris Agreement: What Just Happened?:
The United States affirmed it’s definitely leaving the treaty—but not yet., THE ATLANTIC:
SCIENCE (Aug 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/08/trump-and-the-
paris-agreement-what-just-happened/536040/ [http://perma.cc/4M6U-PECC].
172. See REUTERS, supra note 84. 
173. See Simon Reich, The end of America’s global leadership?, CONVERSATION
(July 1, 2017, 10:24 PM), http://theconversation.com/the-end-of-americas-global-leadership- 
78736 [http://perma.cc/R7Y4-FH3M].
174. See Johannes Urpelainen, Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement means 













    
   
 
  
   
   
      
     
 
   
   
  
 
       
 
  
    
  
  
    
 
  








   
 
      
 
  
   




     
a strong and unified global leadership from the industrialized global 
superpowers, developing countries will be less likely to support climate
proposals from the global powers in the future.176 
Without the participation of the United States, China would likely fill 
the gap regarding climate change and trade.177 Just days after President Trump’s
withdrawal announcement, a meeting took place in Beijing in which “China
launched a number of initiatives to advance clean energy and announced 
partnerships with other governments [to take aim at combatting] climate 
change.”178 While explaining China’s continued commitment to the Paris
Agreement amidst the Trump Administration’s withdrawal announcement,
China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying noted that “[c]limate 
change is a global challenge. No [country] can place itself outside of this.”179 
In addition to the launched initiatives, China and India have already 
shifted to investing in solar and wind energy as renewable energy sources.180 
As of May 2017, China has cut coal use for three years in a row and has 
opted to avoid opening numerous new coal power plants.181  With China’s
coal use dropping by almost ten percent since 2005 and increased reliance 
on  non-fossil  fuels, China is  asserting itself  at the forefront of the
international conversation on climate change.182  Along with China and  
India, France and the United Kingdom have taken increased steps at the 
global leadership table to account for the United States’ absence. France
has introduced a plan to close all coal-fired power plants by 2021, while 
the UK has doubled its contributions to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC).183 These steps show that without the United States’
176. Id. 
177. See Carol Morello & John Wagner, As the U.S. leaves Paris climate accord,




178. Justin Worland, It Didn’t Take Long for China to Fill America’s Shoes on 
Climate Change, TIME (June 8, 2017), http://time.com/4810846/china-energy-climate-change- 
paris-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/YVD2-2V6H].
179. Ahead of Trump Decision, China Says it Will Stick to Paris Climate Deal, 
REUTERS (June 1, 2017, 12:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climatechange-
china/ahead-of-trump-decision-china-says-it-will-stick-to-paris-climate-deal-idUSKBN18S43Q 
[http://perma.cc/QPR3-EYH8].
180. China and India Make Big Strides on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION
(May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/opinion/paris-agreement-climate-
china-india.html [http://perma.cc/Q9KU-GSK3].
181. Id.
182. See Xinhua, Spotlight: China reasserts itself responsible player at Bonn climate 
talks, NEW CHINA (Nov. 18, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/18/c_136 
762725.htm [http://perma.cc/3NAE-TBFZ]. 
183. Markus Wackett, France and UK vow to make up for Trump’s withdrawal of 
climate change funding, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
156
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participation, the international community will rise to recognize and combat 
the threat of climate change, to the detriment of the United States’ international 
reputation.
The withdrawal also impairs the United States’ ability to engage in 
collaborative international efforts resulting from the Paris Agreement.  
Following President Trump’s decision, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm 
Turnbull,184 Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau,185 and UK Prime Minister
Theresa May186 all voiced disapproval of the regressive steps President Trump
took and reiterated their respective country’s commitment to the terms of
the Paris Agreement. 
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: A RECOMMENDATION
There are a few options that may be better for President Trump. The first
and best option for environmental progress would be to remain in the Paris 
Agreement. Withdrawing from the agreement hurts the nation on environmental, 
political, and economic levels. President Trump and his administration
should remain in the Paris Agreement for multiple reasons. 
First, there is already public support that weighs in favor of remaining 
in the agreement.187 According to a national poll by the Yale Program on 
Climate Change Communication, by a 5 to 1 margin, voters said that the United
States should remain as a member of the agreement.188 Additionally, in
world/europe/trump-climate-change-funding-france-uk-vow-make-up-money-paris-
agreement-a8057546.html [http://perma.cc/Y8UU-NVP8].
184. Louise Yaxley, Donald Trump’s decision ‘disappointing’ but Australia still committed 
to Paris agreement, Malcolm Turnbull says, AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP. (June 1, 2017), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-02/donald-trump-paris-deal-decision-disappointing-say-
turnbull/8582696 [http://perma.cc/K3CK-GH6B]. 
185. Peter Zimonjic, Trudeau tells Trump Canada is Disappointed by Withdrawal from 
Paris Climate Deal, CBC NEWS (June 1, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-
mckenna-trump-paris-deal-1.4142211 [http://perma.cc/A7FW-M2B9].
186. Heather Stewart, Theresa May speaks out against Trump climate change stance 
at UN, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/20/ 
theresa-may-speaks-out-against-trump-climate-change-stance-at-un [http://perma.cc/7KCS- 
TTP5]. 
187. Ed Maibach, Anthony Leiserowitz & Jennifer Marlon, Should the U.S. Stay in 
the Paris Agreement?, US NEWS (June 1, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
countries/articles/2017-06-01/a-bipartisan-majority-thinks-the-us-should-stay-in-the-paris- 
agreement [http://perma.cc/FVA6-4QLP].
188. Jennifer Marlon, Eric Fine, & Anthony Leiserowitz, Majorities of Americans in
Every State Support Participation in the Paris Agreement, 2017 YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE
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response to President Trump’s denouncement of the Paris Agreement and
while noting that he “was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, 
not Paris,” Pittsburgh Mayor Bill Peduto quickly responded that “Pittsburgh
stands with the world & will follow Paris Agreement.”189 Mayor Peduto’s
statements along with the overwhelming public support show that this is
a serious issue for passionate voters and state leaders.
Second, the United States remaining on the outside of such a global 
movement will ultimately hurt the United States’ standing as a global leader
in the climate change discussion. Remaining on the outside of this global 
movement would set a bad precedent going forward for global climate
cooperation.190 The gap left by the United States also creates an opening
for other countries to come together to realign the power structure regarding
climate initiatives and programs going forward.191 
Third, remaining in the Paris Agreement would be better for the United
States economy, according to some of the largest job creators, by “strengthening
competitiveness, creating jobs, markets, and growth, and reducing business 
risks.”192 Remaining in the agreement would benefit the United States 
economically by promoting growth in clean energy areas. Already, the 
United States has witnessed more jobs being produced by cleaner energy 
companies. The natural gas, solar, and wind industries employ over 838,000
workers, compared to that of the coal industry, which employs roughly
160,000 workers.193 
However, if the Trump Administration continues with the withdrawal 
plan, the best remaining option for tackling the global issue going forward
is for states to continue to follow the guidelines of the Paris Agreement— 
CHANGE COMM ¶¶ 1, 4, http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/paris_agreement_
by_state/ [http://perma.cc/2S9G-5JWW].
189. Sean Rossman, Pittsburgh mayor to Trump: Um, actually we’re pro-Paris
Climate Agreement, USA TODAY (June 1, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/onpolitics/2017/06/01/pittsburgh-mayor-calls-out-trump-paris-climate-agreement-speech/ 
363466001/ [http://perma.cc/U428-PL3D].
190. See Hai-Bin Zhang, Han-Cheng Dai, Hua-Xia  Lai, & Wen-Tao Weng,  U.S.
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Reasons, Impacts, and China’s Response, 8 ADVANCES 
CLIMATE CHANGE RES. 220, 222 (2017), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ 
S1674927817301028  [http://perma.cc/XNE8-5MUL].
191. See David Sanger and Jane Perlez, Trump Hands the Chinese a Gift: The Chance 
for Global Leadership, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/ 
01/us/politics/climate-accord-trump-china-global-leadership.html [http://perma.cc/TV5T-
3H9E].
192. Alanna Petroff, CEOs Make a Final Urgent Plea: Don’t Pull Out of Paris 
Accord, CNN (June 1, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/01/news/trump-paris-climate-deal-
business-ceo/index.html [http://perma.cc/TAA4-H3LL]. 
193. DEPT. OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT REPORT 29 (2017), https:// 
www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/2017%20US%20Energy%20and%20Jobs% 
20Report_0.pdf  [http://perma.cc/7VHP-9WCG]. 
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even without the United States as a signed party of the agreement.194 
Since June 2017, according to the We Are Still In Campaign, “more than
2,500 leaders from America’s city halls, state houses, boardrooms, and 
college campuses, representing more than 130 million Americans and $6.2 
trillion of the U.S economy have signed the We Are Still In declaration.”195 
In addition to the We Are Still In campaign, a group called America’s
Pledge, run by former New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg and California 
Governor Jerry Brown, likewise reaffirmed their commitment to the guidelines 
of the Paris Agreement noting that
The group of American cities, states, and businesses who remain committed
to the Paris Agreement represents a bigger economy than any nation outside the
U.S. and China. Together they are helping deliver on the promise of the agreement
and ensuring the U.S. remains a global leader in the fight against climate change.
In Paris, the U.S. pledged to measure and report our progress reducing emissions 
alongside every other nation. Through America’s Pledge, we’re doing just that, 
and we’re going to continue to uphold our end of the deal, with or without 
Washington.196 
These movements by students, teachers, parents, politicians, and business 
leaders have great force behind them. There is legal precedent for states
having the freedom to take on increased responsibilities and roles on global 
issues like this. As Justice Brandeis noted over eighty years ago in New 
State Co. v. Liebermann, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”197 
With states, businesses, organizations, and most importantly, concerned 
citizens taking up the mantle for continuing the goals set in place by the
Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC, and other agreements aimed at combatting 
194. See Allison H. Ross & Meghan V. Brown, Environmental Federalism: Individual
States, Cities, and Businesses Vow to Combat Climate Change, 59 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 
36, 38 (2017). 
195. Declaration, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/we-are-still-declaration
(last updated Summer 2018) [http://perma.cc/KP9G-QV7H].
196. Press Release, America’s Pledge, America’s Pledge Co-Chairs Mike Bloomberg
and Governor Jerry Brown Reaffirm U.S. Commitment to Paris Agreement on Climate 




197. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
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climate change, the international framework introduced over two decades
ago remains steady in the face of uncertainty. 
But the growing realization is that unless the terms of the agreement are 
restructured in a way that caters to President Trump’s demands, the Trump
Administration will not return to the Paris Agreement. Therefore, the 
recommendation for supporters of the goals of the Paris Agreement is for
states, cities, businesses, and individuals to continue to follow the goals and
guidelines of the Paris Agreement. 
VI. CONCLUSION
There are three key takeaways worth noting. First, due to the previous
existing legislative history subject to the Senate’s approval, the Paris 
Agreement should be understood as an Executive Agreement+. The agreement 
compliments the existing legislative support and would expedite the  
process for the president to implement agreements complementary to  
existing congressionally supported initiatives. This classification would 
open the door to more executive agreements based on pre-existing legislative
authority, and may revolutionize the way executive agreements are made 
going forward. An Executive Agreement+ classification would also entitle 
the Paris Agreement to receive more protection and authority based on its
pre-existing Senate authorization from the UNFCCC.  Second, if President 
Trump chooses to withdraw as per the terms of the agreement, it is likely 
that such withdrawal would be supported by and in line with the Constitution 
and Supreme Court precedents. There would not be a problem as it is of 
great national importance to allow the President to unilaterally withdraw 
from certain non-binding agreements under the Vesting Clause or the Sole 
Organ Doctrine. However, if President Trump instead decides that the 
Paris Agreement was entered into unconstitutionally (without the advice 
and consent of the Senate), then abrogation may be a possible method of
termination, but one that would also likely violate international law.  Finally, 
because the United States’ status as a party to the Paris Agreement remains 
in a sort of international legal “purgatory” based on the withdrawal terms 
and waiting period of the Paris Agreement, there are still ways for concerned 
citizens, businesses, universities, community heads, and state leaders to
encourage the continuation of the guidelines put in place by the Paris
Agreement at lower levels. Although these parties would not be official
signatories of the agreement, and could not be legally bound by a non-Senate
approved international agreement at the domestic level, the intent and
framework of the Paris Agreement could survive regardless of the United 
States’ official position as a party member or as an outsider of the agreement. 
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